

African Union

Crisis in the Central Africa Republic

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Delegates,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee of African Union, Mayo College Girls' School Model United Nations Conference, 2015. The following pages intend to guide you in the research of the topic that will be debated at AU, MCGSMUN 2015.

Please note this guide only provides the basis for your investigation. It is your responsibility to find as much information necessary on the topics and how they relate to the country you represent. The more information and understanding you acquire on the agenda, the more you will be able to influence the Resolution writing process through debates [formal and informal caucuses], and the MUN experience as a whole. Please feel free to contact us if and when you face challenges in your research or formatting your Position Papers. Enjoy researching and writing your Position Papers.

We look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

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A. An Introduction to the African Union;**Its History and its Vision:**

The African Union (AU) is a union consisting of 54 African states. It was established on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa and launched on 9 July 2002 in South Africa to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The most important decisions of the AU are made by the Assembly of the African Union, a semi-annual meeting of the heads of state and government of its member states. The AU's secretariat, the African Union Commission, is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The OAU initiatives paved the way for the birth of AU. In July 1999, the Assembly decided to convene an extraordinary session to expedite the process of economic and political integration in the continent. Since then, four Summits have been held leading to the official launching of the African Union:

1. The Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) decided to establish an African Union
2. The Lome Summit (2000) adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union.
3. The Lusaka Summit (2001) drew the road map for the implementation of the AU
4. The Durban Summit (2002) launched the AU and convened the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union.

The vision of the African Union is that of: “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena.” This vision of a new, dynamic and integrated Africa are fully realized through relentless struggle on several fronts and as a long-term endeavour of the AU, that’s spear-heading Africa’s development and integration. The organisation is made up of various bodies that include The Assembly, The Executive Council, The Commission, The Permanent Representatives' Committee, Peace and Security Council (PSC), Pan-African Parliament, Economic Social and Cultural Council, The Court of Justice, The Specialized Technical Committees and The AU Commission.

The Objectives of the AU are as follows:

- To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- To promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
- To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- To promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- To establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;
- To promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;

- To promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
- To coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;
- To advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;
- To work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

African Union’s mandate and its relation with the United Nations:

In 2002, the African Union was established with a specific mandate to “intervene in a Member State ... in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. The AU has led the development of new kinds of joint peacekeeping missions with the UN, intervening first and then winning the world body’s support for the missions that it established in Sudan’s Darfur region, which was replaced by 2008 by the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and in Somalia since 2007, which the AU is seeking to place under a UN umbrella.

The AU has clearly had reasonable successes through its direct contribution and collaboration with the international community to settling and minimising conflicts in some of the region’s hotbeds, such as trouble spots in the Sudan, resolving post-election violent conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya, and forcing military coup-makers to hand back power to civilian regimes. Unlike the OUA which followed a doctrine of ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of member states, the AU has the authority through decisions of its Peace and Security Council to interfere in member states to promote peace and protect democracy, including deploying military force in situations in which genocide and crimes against humanity are being committed. AU observer missions are now sent as a matter of routine to cover elections in all member states, in accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). Finally, the AU’s unique voluntary ‘Peer Review Mechanism’ by which individual member states agree to be assessed by a team of experts drawn from other states is designed to encourage democracy and good governance.

However, the AU’s lack of influence over external interventions led by the UN Security Council and the “coalitions of the willing” that the Council mandates to implement its decisions– which often have their own more parochial interests – has sometimes resulted in undesirable outcomes. The three African votes on the UN Security Council cast by South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon in favour of action in Libya in March 2011 allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in the country, and critics regarded these votes as contradicting the AU’s own roadmap for peace in Libya.

B. Introduction to the Agenda:

The Crisis in the Central African Republic

I. Background

Although the Central African Republic has significant amounts of uranium, crude oil, gold and diamond deposits, the country has failed to achieve sustained economic development and remains among the ten poorest nations in the African continent. This is mainly due to the political instability nearing five decades since independence in 1960, resulting from a succession of military coups and predatory governments.

The most recent of these political struggles is the conflict which started on 10 December 2012. Séléka, an leftist alliance of militias consisting of the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding (A2R), and the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK), took control of major population centres, accusing the government and the then president François Bozizé, of neglecting the peace agreements of 2007 and 2011. Despite the military forces deployed by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the capital Bangui was captured on 24 March 2013. Since then, the rebel leader Michel Djotodia had been acting as the interim president of the transitional government, and was expected to head the state until the next presidential election in 2015. While Djotodia had announced in September 2013 that Séléka had been dissolved, the majority of the former Muslim militias have been involved in attacks against civilians, rape and destruction of villages. With the Christian population taking up arms against the former Séléka elements, violence is spreading rapidly, leading to nearly 520,000 refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2014).

In addition, the CAR is involved in periodic skirmishes over water and grazing rights with southern Sudan and hosts 11,260 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan (UNHCR, 2014). Law and order have been absent for protracted periods with children subjected to sex trafficking and recruited by militias as child soldiers. Forced sexual trade of women is also prevalent.

II. History of Instability

Though the CAR gained independence from France in 1960, its people have experienced repeated bouts of political instability. In particular, the country has been subjected to five separate coups d'état, the first of which occurred in 1965, when President David Dacko was overthrown by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Following years of additional unrest under the Bokassa regime, Ange-Felix Patasse became President in 1993. The democratically-elected Patasse stayed in power for a decade, until he was ousted by former army chief of staff Francois Bozize in March 2003.

Upon seizing the presidency, Bozize suspended the country's Constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. Though he promised to step down after an initial transitional period to democracy, Bozize was reelected in 2005 and began calling for national unity, development, and democratic freedom. A peace deal known as the Birao Peace Agreement, which was signed in 2007 between the government of the CAR and the rebel group Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (Union of Democratic Forces Coalition – UFDR), appeared to solidify Bozize's intentions. Further progress was seemingly made with the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which, in addition to the UFDR, also included the rebel groups Armee Populaire pour la Restauration de la Democratie (People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy – APRD) and the Front démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (Democratic Front for the People of the Central African Republic – FDPC) in its negotiations. Together, these deals promised amnesty; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs for former combatants; and political power-sharing.

Yet, the fragility of these peace deals was soon evident. In 2010, the Bozize regime came under fire from opposition leaders who announced their intention to boycott the January 2011 elections in light of institutional changes affecting the voter registration process. When Bozize was reelected in 2011, his victory was shrouded by allegations of election fraud that further threatened the already-declining security situation in the CAR. The Bozize government's inability to demobilize rebels and ex-soldiers, along with such foreign involvement as a February 2012 joint offensive between troops from the CAR and

neighbouring Chad (which sought to weaken a Chadian rebel movement and left thousands of civilians displaced) added to growing instability throughout the country.

III. March 2013 Coup d'Etat

In December 2012, a loose rebel coalition named the Seleka initiated a military campaign to overthrow Bozize's government. The Seleka, mainly composed of factions of armed groups in northeastern CAR, including the UFDR and FDPC, as well as the Convention Patriotique pour le Salut Wa Kodro (CPSK) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix – CPJP), criticized Bozize's government for failing to implement the DDR program in the northeast, declining to investigate rebel and government crimes that had been occurring since 2005, and demonstrating a general lack of governance in its region. Capitalizing on the fact that the country had been "virtually ungoverned" outside of the capital, Bangui, for years, the Seleka rapidly captured several strategic towns in early 2013 and was poised to take Bangui next. A hasty intervention by Chad and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) instead persuaded the Seleka to negotiate with Bozize's government. The result of these negotiations was the Libreville Agreement of January 2013, which established a three-year power-sharing arrangement in the CAR. In addition, it stipulated that Bozize would remain in office until 2016, but that he would not be allowed to run for a third term beyond that.

Unfortunately, however, the Libreville Agreement was made between regional heads of state rather than heads of warring parties in the CAR, which, as the Council on Foreign Relations noted, increased the difficulty of implementing real change because it neglected to consider the "intricacies" of the conflict. Ultimately, ECCAS failed to monitor the full implementation of the Libreville Agreement, and Bozize never undertook any of the reforms required under the transition.

The government's failure to carry out agreements under the 2013 Libreville Agreement generated anger and frustration on the part of the Seleka, who, sensing a strategic advantage on the ground, resurged and took control of Bangui and fifteen of the CAR's sixteen provinces on 24 March 2013, a move which simultaneously caused Bozize to flee to Cameroon. Upon seizing the capital, Seleka leader Michel Djotodia proclaimed himself President and suspended CAR's constitution. Rather than recognizing Djotodia as President, a hurried ECCAS Summit on 4 April 2013 called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), which would create a new constitution, conduct elections in eighteen months, and select an interim President. On 13 April, the TNC ultimately chose Djotodia as interim president, given that he was the sole candidate vying for the position.

Djotodia's leadership was immediately criticized at the international level, as his Seleka fighters were accused of having used child soldiers in their successful overthrow of the Bozize government, as well as having engaged in the looting of villages, the raping and killing of civilians, and the abduction of members of the national army. Continued violence on the part of the Seleka even after Djotodia took office raised additional questions about the security situation in the CAR.

IV. From Political to Sectarian Violence: Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka

Given Djotodia's unconventional assumption of power, the future of the CAR immediately following the installation of its new transitional government remained uncertain. While Djotodia's government took a positive step in May 2013 when it indicted Bozize for crimes against humanity committed during his tenure, it failed to extend this concern for human rights abuses to the Seleka. Some hoped that Djotodia's surprise move to dissolve the Seleka in September 2013 meant that he was taking the first step in

reasserting the authority of the state by separating his government from Seleka members who had continually committed atrocities in the field. Indeed, a statement from his office declared that anyone acting under the name of Seleka “would be punished.” However, others feared that the decision could plunge the country into even greater instability, as dissension between various factions of the former coalition could further weaken the transitional framework.

Unfortunately, these concerns proved all too accurate. Frustrated with incompetent law enforcement in the country that had allowed Seleka crimes to go unpunished, many civilians decided to form self-defense militias known as Anti-Balaka, in an effort to confront the Seleka’s abuses. Clashes between former Seleka members and these vigilante groups began in late September 2013 and dramatically intensified in December 2013, leaving thousands of people dead. Specifically, a massacre on 13 December 2013, which resulted in the deaths of twenty-seven Muslims in Bohong, as well as two more that occurred in January 2014 and claimed the lives of fifty Muslims, demonstrated that tension in the CAR had risen to a precarious level. A December 2013 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report also found more generally that Anti-Balaka groups were responsible for killing Seleka, burning their homes, and stealing their cattle, and that the Seleka was guilty of having violently retaliated against the Anti-Balaka. In the midst of this escalating violence, several soldiers from the CAR's former national armed forces and Presidential Guard, who had remained loyal to Bozize, also began joining the Anti-Balaka ranks.

Though the Anti-Balaka groups were initially created as a civilian protection method, the fighting has since become more sectarian in nature, with some Anti-Balaka groups now targeting Muslims in response to reports that ex-Seleka have been terrorizing Christian communities. Ex-Seleka fighters have in turn been arming Muslim populations, allegedly with help from warlords in neighboring Chad and Sudan. Despite this development, however, it should be noted that the sectarian turn is a symptom rather than a cause of years of institutional decay and poor governance in the CAR. Journalist Michela Wrong further substantiates the concern of using such a “reductive” definition of conflict in the CAR, noting the “myriad and complex” political and socio-economical causes of violence that have led to the extreme nature of the current crisis.

In light of the increasing violence and his inability to stop or prevent it, President Djotodia resigned on 10 January 2014 at a two-day ECCAS summit. A week later, former mayor of Bangui Catherine Samba-Panza was elected as interim president of the CAR. Samba-Panza’s promises of peace and national unity have thus far resulted in a plan to reorganize the security forces in the CAR so that both Muslims and Christians will be protected from violence, along with efforts to appoint corruption-free government leaders. While it is too soon to assess the impact of Samba-Panza’s leadership on the crisis in the CAR, the first female president of the country has already been dubbed “the woman who would save Central Africa.” Elsewhere, a January 2014 UN report has suggested that Chadian citizens and peacekeepers are also responsible for mass killings in the CAR, a discovery that adds yet another layer of difficulty for those seeking a peaceful resolution to this crisis. A 5 February 2014 article by Human Rights Watch (HRW) corroborates this issue, noting that many Seleka have been regrouping in northeastern CAR, and that Chadian peacekeepers are facilitating their movement while also committing human rights abuses.

Even more disturbing, on 12 February 2014, Amnesty International released a report in which it accused “international peacekeepers [of having] failed to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Muslim civilians in the western part of the Central African Republic.” Specifically, Amnesty documented how several Muslim localities were now completely empty of Muslims, and that small numbers of remaining Muslims in these

towns had begun seeking refuge in churches and mosques. Human Rights Watch corroborated Amnesty's stance by documenting how Muslims in the CAR had been forced to flee the country to escape violence. UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Antonio Guterres added his concern by calling the crisis in the CAR "a humanitarian catastrophe of unspeakable proportions" and warning that the CAR's Muslims were facing massive "ethno-religious cleansing." In response to these allegations, the government in the CAR stated on 17 February 2014 that it had arrested 11 Anti-Balaka officers and charged them with war crimes.

V. Regional Involvement

Formal regional involvement over the situation in the Central African Republic originates with the 1997 Bangui Agreements. This agreement included the creation of a monitoring group called the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB). It was comprised of 800 troops sent by the leaders of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo. Led by the government of Gabon, MISAB drew logistical support from France, and acted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (1945). Additionally, the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique" (FOMUC) was created by Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. It was carried out under the auspices of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and had the goal to restore peace and security. The creation of FOMUC was the attempt to integrate regional actors to the peace-building process. Eventually, FOMUC was transformed into MICOPAX according to a decision by ECCAS. Currently, MICOPAX facilitates the establishment of durable peace and security in the Central African Republic by supporting sustainable development in the country. It is further mandated to protect civilians, secure the territory, and contribute to the national reconciliation process. Perhaps the regional state most committed to CAR peace and security is the Republic of South Africa. For instance, since 2007, South African troops have assisted the CAR's military forces in upgrading and developing their capabilities. South African forces even suffered casualties when 200 soldiers were deployed in an anti-Seleka operation and 13 soldiers were killed. One month after this incident, South African president Jacob Zuma joined a meeting of regional leaders in Chad, where the heads of state acquiesced to Seleka leader Michel Djotodia becoming a transitional president and for French support in stabilizing and securing CAR. Immediately after the coup d'état Djotodia the African Union (AU) imposed economic sanctions, travel restrictions, an asset freeze on Seleka's leaders, and suspended the Central African Republic from membership. Furthermore, the AU called upon the other members to support its future efforts to stabilize the situation in the Central African Republic.

Chad's President, Idriss Déby, is widely viewed as among most influential leaders in CAR, but also as a problematic actor, due to his role in bringing ex-President Bozizé to power, allegations that he allowed Seleka to seize power (or even provided support) when he became dissatisfied with Bozizé, and the fact that some key Seleka figures are reportedly Chadian nationals or have other ties to Chad. Bozizé's reliance on a Chadian security detail contributed to perceptions that Chadians enjoyed impunity for abuses committed in CAR, such as looting and banditry, during his presidency. Chadian troops were also accused of abetting or participating in Seleka abuses. Though Chad was one of the founding troop contributors to MISCA, it withdrew its roughly 800 troops from the AU force in April 2014 after they were criticized for shooting unarmed civilians.

Many CAR Muslims trace their family origins to Chad (although many Chadians are not Muslim), and many CAR residents appear to associate the two identities, broadly referring to Muslims as "Chadians." These

overlapping identities appear to have driven anti-Muslim violence, as anti-balaka groups have broadly targeted Muslim civilians while claiming to target “foreigners... from the Chad and Darfur borderlands, who have looted and attacked their country in conjunction with the last two coups (in 2003 and 2013), and who happen to be Muslim.” In early 2014, as attacks against Muslims, Arabic-speakers, and foreign nationals increased, neighbouring states, including Chad, evacuated thousands of their citizens, with international assistance. In doing so, as mentioned above, Chadian troops facilitated the evacuation of tens of thousands of Muslims to the northeast and to Chad. It may be difficult to distinguish Chadian migrants returning to their ancestral home from internationally recognized and protected refugees.

Cameroon, for its part, hosted former president Bozizé when he first went into exile, and is now contending with an influx of refugees from CAR into its already fragile north. The flood of refugees from CAR into Cameroon is adding to concerns about instability emanating from northeastern Nigeria, due to the ongoing conflict with Boko Haram.

As of 2012, the government of South Africa was seen as cultivating growing ties with CAR, and South African troops deployed to CAR, ostensibly for bilateral security cooperation. Some analysts interpreted South Africa’s moves as part of a strategy to pursue and protect potential mineral interests, and more broadly of seeking greater influence in francophone Africa. During Seleka’s assault on Bangui in early 2013, Seleka clashed with South African forces, killing at least 13 South African soldiers. The incident sparked controversy within South Africa about the purpose of South African deployments to CAR, and South Africa withdrew its remaining forces.

VI. International Response

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Since the initial stages of recent conflict in the CAR, the African Union (AU) has attempted to address the situation without international assistance. Its initial effort came through the establishment of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) upon the conclusion of the first Libreville Summit in October 2002. By 2008, MICOPAX had become the responsibility of the Economic Community of Central African States, or ECCAS. That same year, in response to increasing violence throughout the country, the AU also decided to send troops from the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) into the CAR. However, the FOMAC troops were eventually overwhelmed by the Seleka violence that followed Djotodia’s installation as president in 2013.

On 10 October 2013, the Security Council met to amend the mandate of BINUCA, a UN field office in the CAR which has sought to “help consolidate peace, foster national reconciliation, and strengthen democratic institutions, as well as [strengthen] the promotion and protection of human rights.” At this point, many in the international community had hoped that the Security Council would also create a UN peacekeeping operation in the CAR. Unfortunately, Resolution 2121 – the result of the October 2013 meeting – only went so far as to reinforce and adjust the mandate of BINUCA. It did not permanently close discussions on the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping mission in the future, however, as it also required the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within thirty days on its plans for the creation of an African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (known alternatively as AFISM-CAR, or MISCA), which “include[ed] the possible option of a transformation of MISCA into a United Nations

peacekeeping operation.” In addition, Resolution 2121 further underscored “the primary responsibility of the Central African authorities to protect the population.”

A few weeks later, on 1 November 2013, the Security Council held an Arria Formula meeting in New York to discuss the "horrendous" situation in the CAR. In his statement to the Council that day, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng reaffirmed that the widespread nature of human rights violations in the CAR could constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. When speaking to the press after the meeting, Mr. Dieng further stressed that the increasingly inter-religious nature of the conflict concerned him, noting that "this will end with Christian communities, Muslim communities killing each other, which means that if we don't act now and decisively, I will not exclude the possibility of a genocide occurring."

On 15 November 2013, in compliance with the Security Council's aforementioned request from October, the Secretary-General reported on five options for international support in the CAR. These options included: providing bilateral/multilateral support to MISCA; establishing a UN Trust Fund for assistance; creating a limited UN support package funded through assessed and voluntary contributions; implementing a comprehensive UN support package funded through assessed contributions; and, finally, transforming MISCA into a UN peacekeeping operation. According to Security Council Report, several UNSC members believed that a UN peacekeeping operation was both the "inevitable" and most viable solution. However, others wanted to support the AU's desire to try its own independent peacekeeping force (MISCA) first.

As such, on 5 December 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2127 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Resolution recognized the Transitional Authorities' primary responsibility to protect the population of the CAR, and simultaneously authorized the deployment of MISCA and an additional contingent of French troops to take all necessary measures to contribute to the protection of civilians, the stabilization of the country, and the restoration of State authority, among others. In addition, the Resolution imposed a sanctions regime on the CAR, which included a year-long arms embargo by Member States, accompanied by the Security Council's "strong intent to swiftly consider imposing targeted measures, including travel bans and assets freezes, against individuals who act to undermine the peace, stability and security" in the nation, and again asked the Secretary-General to report to the Council in three months on options for transforming MISCA into a peacekeeping operation.

Two days later, on 7 December, the AU announced that it would increase its troop levels to 6,000. France also decided to deploy 1,600 troops to the CAR for six months, as authorized under Resolution 2127. The French mission, known as Operation Sangaris, has agreed to work alongside African troops and assist efforts to disarm rebel factions throughout the CAR. However, Operation Sangaris has been criticized for focusing on the ex-Seleka to the detriment of giving the Anti-Balaka the freedom to continue its violent activities.

On 19 December 2013, the AU subsequently authorized the deployment of 3,600 troops under the auspices of MISCA, which effectively took over from MICOPAX. While this added more security on the ground, MISCA's numbers were judged to be insufficient by many. In addition, MISCA has also struggled to implement effective DDR programs and reform security measures in the CAR, as evidenced in continued rounds of fighting.

After meeting on 22 January 2014 to discuss developments in the crisis in the CAR, the UNSC proceeded to adopt Resolution 2134 on 28 January, which authorized the deployment of a European Union (EU) force and called for enforcement of sanctions against the CAR. On 16 February, 2014, the EU announced that it would be sending troops into CAR in March, and France stated it would also be sending in an additional 400 soldiers.

Importantly, after much delay the Security Council passed Resolution 2149 authorizing a 10,000-strong peacekeeping operation, including 1,800 police personnel, known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA includes a protection of civilians mandate, human rights component, and support for accountability measures.

United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG)

On 1 October 2013, UN Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide, Mr. Adama Dieng, and the Responsibility to Protect, Dr. Jennifer Welsh, both issued a statement expressing their serious concern for the situation in the CAR. Noting that “the breakdown of law and order and the apparent inability of the transitional authorities to exercise control over Seleka soldiers committing atrocities could presage a deepening crisis and a return to large-scale fighting,” the Special Advisers warned that these and other risk factors, such as religious tensions, have “opened the door to the risk of atrocity crimes.” On 22 January 2014, Dieng delivered a statement to the Security Council, (only the third time in which the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide had briefed the Council in an official meeting) wherein he affirmed that “the primary responsibility for the protection of [the CAR’s] populations lies with the Central African authorities,” but also added that “the international community must take concrete measures to assist the State to stop the abuses and protect the civilian populations.” Despite the fact that the international community was responding belatedly, he added that “there is still a window to act to mobilize appropriate resources and to reverse one of the worst human rights and humanitarian crises of our time.”

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

The human rights abuses by the ex-Seleka, combined with the clashes between ex-Seleka fighters and the anti-Balaka forces, have led to a rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation. After returning from a trip to the CAR on 29 October 2013, Director of UN Humanitarian Operations John Ging declared that “the number one issue today is protection, and the atrocities that are being committed against the civilian population are indescribable.” According to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of 3 January 2014, 935,000 people, or 1/5 of the CAR’s entire population, had been displaced, with another 233,000 in neighboring countries.

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

On 12 September 2013, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay presented a report on the situation in the CAR, pursuant to the Human Rights Council’s request made earlier that year. The Report concludes that between 10 December 2012 to 23 March 2013, and after the 24 March coup, both the Bozize government and Seleka leaders had “engaged in summary executions and extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture and looting of private and public property,” and that the Seleka had also committed crimes of sexual violence and crimes against children. Several months later, in a statement released on 27 January 2014, High Commissioner Pillay further highlighted the deteriorating security situation in the CAR by referencing in particular her concern for the “proliferation of armed groups and the explosion of common criminality” throughout the country.

International Criminal Court (ICC)

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bensouda, joined others in expressing her alarm over the situation in the CAR on 9 December 2013, imploring all parties (including both ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka elements) to "stop attacking civilians and committing crimes, or risk being investigated and prosecuted by my Office." On 7 February 2014, Bensouda announced that the ICC would be opening an investigation on possible war crimes and crimes against humanity that had been occurring in the CAR.

C. Major problems within the issue that need to be addressed:**1. Military and security situation**

The security situation in Bangui and the rest of the country remains fragile. Although the worst violence and abuses by Seleka forces seem to be over, undisciplined and disgruntled former rebels roam the capital and smaller towns at night, looting, raping and killing with impunity. There are also reports that Seleka forces continue to hunt and kill former members of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA, the 1,500-strong former national army), whom it accuses of preparing a return of ousted President Bozizé. The military and security situation in CAR is the more complex due to the prominent cross-border dynamic of the conflict. Other countries and their militaries are or have been involved one way or another in the CAR, while the country also serves as a sanctuary for foreign rebel groups, most notably since 2008 the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the south-east, but also the Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR) of the Chadian warlord 'General' Abdel Kader, alias Baba Laddé.

2. Politics and governance

Another major concern is the rapidly decreasing cohesion within the Seleka coalition. The four main rebel movements and other affiliated groups were united in their goal of ousting the Bozizé regime, but lacked any postcoup plan of action or constructive common programme for the country. Once in power, the cracks in the coalition have widened and each movement is fighting for its own turf. The National Transitional Council, the advisory and law making body of CAR established by President Bozizé in 2004 to draft a new constitution and prepare for that year's elections, was retained after the Seleka takeover. Despite electing Michel Djotodia as the interim President and the Speaker of the National Transitional Council as the Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye, the Council remains weak, with its 105 members divided on how to advance the transition.

3. Religious tensions

Ethnic and religious tensions have always been part of the undercurrent of events in the CAR. Seleka fighters, predominantly from the north-east of the country and of Muslim faith, largely targeted non-Muslim neighbourhoods and businesses during their advance on Bangui in December and January, and their eventual capture of the city in March. This trend has continued during Seleka's tenureship, provoking fears of a sustained Muslim-Christian conflict. Small-scale disputes have traditionally occurred between nomadic cattle-breeding groups or *élèveurs* (often Muslim) and sedentary farmers or *agricultures* (often non-Muslim), or between Muslim traders and other people, who often consider the traders as foreigners. Christians (nearly 50 per cent of the population) fear that Muslims (10-15 per cent of the population) will

take revenge for decades of marginalization and neglect, and worry that radical Islamist elements may now try to impose their rule. Since the outbreak of the current crisis, many ordinary Muslims fear a backlash from Christians as a result of the often violent tactics employed by Seleka since their takeover.

4. Economic and humanitarian consequences

The large-scale destruction and displacement caused by the Seleka campaign and the continuing insecurity in many parts of the country have brought most economic activity to a standstill. It is alleged that the state has been kept afloat by short term loans from certain ECCAS members and other friendly Muslim states. The diamond trade, a main source of income for the state, has been hit by CAR's suspension from the Kimberley Process, a decision which has backfired on the diamond dealers who allegedly financed Seleka to overthrow the Bozizé regime. The economic paralysis caused by the displacement of people, destruction of infrastructure and insecurity of movement are likely to produce a humanitarian disaster in addition to the political and security crises already manifest. The assistance of aid agencies, more greatly needed than ever, is being hampered by a restrictive operating environment. The political reluctance of major donors such as the EU, the US and the World Bank to recognize the new government is also hindering the ability of aid organisations to comprehensively roll out their operations in the country.

5. Military offensive creating humanitarian problems

The international community and the government of the Central African Republic (CARG) had attached much importance to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as the solution to the Central African Republic's (CAR) long running conflict. This would appear logical - disarm the rebels and reintegrate them back in to a peaceful society. This process, promoted by the United Nations (UN) in the Central African Republic (CAR) was beset by problems such as the slow roll out of the program, mismanagement of funds by the government (CARG) and difficulty raising funds from the international community. Despite an agreement reached in April 2009 that produced a list of rebels to be disarmed and the acceptance by the CARG to use money granted by the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) for DDR for its expressed purpose, observers placed too much faith in the process as a solution to the CAR's ills.

D. Some of the significant points that a resolution should address;

1. The role and contribution of the international community: How and to what extent should the international community intervene with the situation in order to support the security sector reform?
2. The ceasefire agreement: How can the need for an immediate ceasefire agreement be addressed? What is the role of the international community while monitoring the compliance with the terms of the agreement?
3. What are the roles of the parties and who should provide assistance and financial support during this process?
4. What governmental changes are required to improve Human Rights in the nation?
5. What reconciliation strategies could be adopted to end the current instability in the government?
6. How can separation of power be made more prominent in the nation?
7. How can The AU-led forces restore immediate law and order in Bangui?
8. What steps can the AU-led forces under MISCA and the French take to secure areas where tension between Christians and Muslims is high?

9. How can AU ensure that MISCA has full operational capacity, during the programmes?
10. How can steps like supporting inter-religious dialogue and implementing urgent reconstruction projects, be made more efficient in soothing religious tensions?
11. How can the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Seleka combatants be implemented more thoroughly?
12. How can fund programmes in the CAR be implemented in a quicker way? Also, how can problems like delay in the delivery of material goods from neighbouring countries, be eliminated?
13. How can the difficulty of deploying international and national staff (human resource) in some areas be tackled?

In order to resolve the political instability and stem the regionalization of the conflict the following factors must be considered:

14. How can neighbouring countries strictly reform virtually undefined and unpatrolled national borders? (Something that's a major cause of migration in response to physical or political insecurity, or even the proliferation of illegal arms in the country).
15. What are the small scale solutions to sub-regional problems (like that in the area where Chad, Sudan, and the CAR meet, where people are constantly in search of arable lands and water)? How can these solutions be used to prevent further problems throughout the sub-region?
16. What are the solutions to the internal political divisions that are sustaining the conflict?

E. Conclusion:

The situation in the Central African Republic is in disorder. Since independence, the country has been fraught by turmoil, violence, and internal conflicts. Several entities such as the AU, as well as NGOs are involved in establishing a safe and secure environment for the population in the Central African Republic. However, their efforts are undermined by the constant lack of security in the country. If the appropriate national authorities, with assistance of the international organizations, could create safe circumstances, a significant step towards a stable Central African Republic will have been made, as security is a key precondition for the success of further peace-building measures. One question delegates have to examine is how this can best be achieved. There are several existing peace agreements, but some of the key actors are not in compliance with them. Still, these peace agreements are a cornerstone for future progress in addressing the situation in the Central African Republic. The upcoming findings of the next biannual review of the strategic framework of the PBC should prove helpful. Several questions stand out. Is there a possibility to bring all involved actors to adhere to the peace agreements already made? How can democratic elections take place securely? Is the international community able to use the peace agreements and develop them further in order to create a safe environment for the civil society?

Important resolutions and documents on CAR:

1. Country-Specific Configuration on Central African Republic, "Rule of Law and Good Governance in the Central African Republic" Peacebuilding Commission
2. UNSC Res/861 (2009)

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1861\(2009\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1861(2009))

3. UNSC/RES/1834 (2008) [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1834\(2008\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1834(2008))
4. UNSC/RES/1778 (2007) [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1778\(2007\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1778(2007))

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